Introduction
Thus far in the 1980s, the U. S. agricultural sector has been dramatically influenced by macroeconomic policies. In October of 1979, the Federal Reserve In the early 1970s, macroeconomic conditions affecting the agricultural sector were almost the exact opposite of those in the 1980s. In 1972-73, tf·c magnitude of increases in real prices of farm products surprised even the most informed people within the public and private sectors. The move to flexible exchange rates, the rapid expansion of international markets, the emergence of a well-integrated international capital market, and the decreasing barriers between the agricultural economy and other domestic economic sectors all resulted in significant changes in the agricultural sector. During this period, the Federal Reserve expanded the U. S. money supply with the effective objective of accolTuTlodating increases in the re<.:! price of energy; other countries also attempted to inflate away energy price shocks.
These monetary phenomena, combined with (a) the steadily declining value of the U. S. dollar on international currency markets; (b) the existence of barriers to trade which insulated many countries from international prices; (c) export demand growth frrnn a number of countries; and Cd) the elimination of the huge governmental stocks that had accumulated during the 1960s,1 all pointed in the same direction of rapidly increasing U. S. agricultural commodity prices.
In addition to the external linkages with the domestic and international economies, government corrunodity policies continue to playa major role.
Numerous surveys and evaluations of U. S. agricultural policy have been conducted (Brandow; Gardner; Rausser and Farrell) , and many views exist on the formal justification for governmental intervention. For instance, Rausser argues that the only market failure justification for governmental interven-. tion is instability and the absence of markets to insure against risks.
In recent years, less emphasis has been placed on the inherent instability in commodity markets and more emphasis has been placed on external linkages with other markets. The deregulation of the cr~dit and banking system and the shift from fixed exchange rates to flexible rates have increased the exposure of corrunodity markets to international money markets and real trade among countries. Also, greater dependence on trade since the early 1970s has left U. S. agriculture more exposed to shocks from foreign markets.
The linkages of corrunodity markets with U. S. money markets are indeed pervasive. Since farming is extremely capital intensive 2 and debt-to-asset " .1
.~ \, <, .
-3-ratios have risen dramatically over the last 10 years, movements in real interest rates have significant effects on the cost structure facing agricultural production. Stock carrying in storable commodity systems is sensitive to changes in interest rates; and for nonstorable commodities (for example, live cattle and live hogs), breeding stocks are interest-rate sensitive. Adding the influence of interest rates on the value of the dollar, fiscal and monetary policies exert pressure on grain products from both the demand side (export demand, domestic livestock grain demand, and stockholding demand) and the cost side.
Along with these interest rate effects, there appear to be differential effects of monetary policy between agricultural and nonagricultural markets.
If agricultural commodity markets behave as "flex price" markets while other markets behave as "fixed price," there will be different speeds of adjustment in the two types of prices following changes in monetary policy. This means that real increases in agricultural prices will occur even if expectations are formed rationally (Frankel and Hardouvelis) . This is analogous to the exchange rate overshooting first studied by Dornbusch and amounts to either a tax or a subsidy for agriculture (Stamoulis, Chalfant, and Rausser) . Overshooting can introduce further instabilities into a sector that is already inherently unstable.
In the United States, high interest rates and a strong dollar work together with corresponding contractions in world income and agricult~:lal export demand to draw resources out of agricultural production. Only in this fashion will the agricultural sector reach an equilibrium with the balance of the u. ..
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Model Structure
The econometric model we constructed is a quarterly, short-run model with three sectors~-agricultural,macroeconomic (nonagricultural), and international. The intended use of the model is to evaluate policy impacts; hence, the emphasis is on the inclusion of all policy variables of interest--both macroeconomic and agricultural. Table 1 gives a summary of the policy variabIes which are included in the model. Figure 1 illustrates the major linkages between equations of the model. A brief discussion of the structure of the estimated model is presented in this section. 3
"
The specification of the model follows the fixed-flex price distinction advanced by Hicks and Okun; the agricultural sector is modeled as a set of auction markets while the nonagricultural sector is characterized by gradual adjustment of prices. The major components of the nonagricultural representation are domestic aggregate demand (aggregate consumption, aggregate domestic investment, and a government finance sector); aggregate supply represented by price and wage equations; and a monetary/financial sector. Nonagricultural prices are determined by a markup over wages (adjusted for productivity) and material costs, the gap between potential and actual income, and ex '8cted money growth rates as a proxy for inflationary expectations.
The monetary/financial component consists of a money demand equation, a money supply process, and interest rate determination equations. A key element of this sector is that proxies for the excess demand for credit are entered into the short-run interest rate equation. The first variable--to capture public demand for credit--is the ratio of government deficits to nonborrowed reserves, and the private-sector counterpart is the ratio of disposable income to nonborrowed reserves. (Frankel) . Similar to the short-term interest rate specification, a proxy for the excess demand for credit arising in the public sector is included as an explanatory variable in the exchange rate equation. It is defined as the ratio of nonmonetized deficits to nonborrowed reserves.
I
The agricultural sector, aside from the influences of government intervention, is specified as a series of flexible-price markets--wheat, feed grains, beef, poultry, and pork are the sectors included. There are equations for acreage and yields of the crops as well as domestic food and feed demands; private storage demand; government storage demand; the farmer-o\~ed reserve; and export demands. Expected profits from compliance and noncompliance with government programs are the main variables affecting yields and acreages--increases in the former tending toward lower acreages and higher yields, with the opposite effect from the latter variable.
Real interest rates are the important influences in the stockholding equations, with higher rates leading to reduced stockholding. Real interest rates and the levels of stocks are the main determinants of the market price for which a separate equation is estimated. As one might expect, all stocks depress prices, but market stocks have a larger effect than either governmento~~ed stocks or farmer-owned reserves so that there are price effects from moving grain into government storage.
-9-The livestock sector includes a similar set of equations for each of the three products--beef, pork,and poultry. Per capita meJt demands are modeled in price-dependent form as functions of own quantity, t;le price of substitute meats, and income. The supply side of these markets includes inventories, breeding stocks, and placements on feed. The main influences in the livestock markets are the interest rate and the level of income from outside the agricultural sector and the level of feed costs from within.
The model thus incorporates a number of linkages with the rest of the economy. Most of these enter in the usual ways--income and prices in demand curves, the general price level as a deflator, and interest rates as an opportunity cost of holding all stocks. From the international side, rest-ofworld income and prices enter agricultural export equations in a similar fashion as does the exchange rate. Following Chambers and Just and Nishiyama and Rausser, the exchange rate is entered as a separate regressor in the export equations. Several reasons have been advanced for such a specification; but, unfortunately, it is difficult to interpret which of these, if any, accounts for its importance in a particular regression.
Policy Simulation Experiments
The validation exercises for each of the three components (macro, international, and agriculture) have focused on the ex post forecasting properties of the model. To assess the internal consistency of the model, the stability characteristics of the parameters of the model have been examined over some major, distinguishable regimes that define the n~"ure and structure of linkages between the agricultural sector and the macro and international economies. The results of these exercises are outlined in the comprehensive -10-version of this paper which is available upon request. In general, these resuIts suggest the model is sufficiently accurate for policy impact analysis.
Our simulation experiments evaluate the effects on the agricultural~ector of two alternative scenarios, one corresponding to a "tax period" (simiL-::T to [1981] [1982] [1983] ) and another to a "subsidy period" (featuring the easier money and Deficit monetization affects the nominal short-run interest rate both through the liquidity effect (changes in bank reserves) and through the inflation premium effect (changes in money growth). The part of the deficit that is not monetized enters the model as the capital market pressure variable that directly affects the exchange rate. The nonborrowed reserves grow at an average annual rate of 18 percent in the subsidy period. For the tax scenario, the Federal Reserve is assumed not to monetize any of the federal goverTh~ent deficit. The Federal Reserv~follows a tight policy in which money grows at the rate of growth of potential income (or full employnlent income) and so do the bank reserve variables in the system. Growth in nonborrowed reserves averages 3 percent for the tax period.
The higher level of monetization of the deficit in the subsidy period pushes up nominal interest rates through inflationary expectations. On the other hand, there is greater upward pressure on real rates of interest in the tax period due to lower growth in liquidity combined with the same large deficit as in the subsidy period. Net results are apparent from table 2--the nominal interest rate is lower in the subsidy period after the first quarter, while ex post real rates of interest (nominal rates minus the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index) are substantially lower in all quarters. It should be noted that the differences reported in table 2 are based on the assumption that foreign variables remain unchanged in the two scenarios.
If foreign variables tend to move in the same direction as U. S. variables do, then the differentials reported above will change.
Higher levels of income in the subsidy period increase the price level by increasing excess demand for goods. This effect is then transmitted to the rest of the price variables in the model. Not surprisingly, the nominal nonfood price indexes are higher in the subsidy period. This is due both to the money growth and excess demand for goods impact on the CPINF index. As expected, the nominal wage rate is higher in the subsidy period, but (his result is reversed when real wages are evaluated.
For the simulations reported here, the endogenous variables generated by the macro and international components were treated as predetermined and the behavior of the U. S. agricultural sector was simulated. The simulations for the agricultural sector were also conducted under both a "passive" and an "active" public stock policy. In the case of the passive stock policy, if market prices fell below support prices, the government did not intervene by acquiring additional public stocks to raise market prices to the support level. In the case of the active public stock policy, such actions \~ere undertaken by the government to bring market prices in close proximity to the support levels. 4
The supply response implications of the two alternative scenarios are not dramatic. This is in large part because of the very favorable settings for target prices. In the case of feed grains, the endogenous expected prices that are gener8tcd do not exceed the target prices. In the case of wheat, however, target prices are exceeded for the last year of the horizon during the subsidy scenario. As expected, nonparticipation profits grow during the subsidy period, particularly for wheat. As a result, the acreage allocated to wheat is 5 million acres higher in the last year of the horizon for the subsidy scenario versus the tax scenario. In the case of both feed grains and wheat, the differences in yields are very small. In fact, yields are generally higher in the tax scenario largely because of slippage under program compliance.
Nominal and real prices for feed grains and wheat are reported in table 3. In both cases, rather sizable differences exist in the nominal prices between the two scenarios. In the case· of wheat, the nominal differenceS are substantial. Since cash prices are substantially higher than the support price, the share of wheat stocks held by the public sector is rather minimal during the subsidy scenario. Correspondingly, the goverm~,~ntal costs · . aPrice at farm. U. S. averaRe.
b(Ps -Pt)/P t • where P s = real price lmder the subsidy scenario and P t real price under the tax scenario.
cFiRures in parentheses are real prices.
Source: Computed.
-16-for the wheat program under the subsidy scenario are relatively small. In the case of the real price differentials between the tax and subsidy scenarios for wheat, they grow dramatically from the second quarter of 1985 through the last quarter of 1986 reaching a difference of almost 35 percent. In the case of corn, the nominal differences are distinctly larger during the subsidy scenario for the four quart~rs of 1985 but larger for only two quarters of 1986.
Real prices for the subsidy scenario are generally higher during 1985 but lower during 1986 for corn. This is in large part due to the active public stock policy wpich forces the government to enter the market and demand stocks from the private sector. The share of stocks held by the government is dramatically higher under the tax scenario versus the subsidy scenario for corn. S Without the active public stock policy, the depressing effects of the macroeconomic factors would drive corn prices below support levels in the last five quarters of the tax period with real prices also dropping dramatically.
At harvest, corn prices fell below support in 1981 and 1982, with the 1982 price falling as low as 39 cents below support. Hence, the model replicates fairly well the effects of a macroeconomic conditions on corn prices.
As can be seen from the results recorded in table 4, exports playa major role in transmitting the effects of macroeconomic monetary/fiscal policy to the agricultural sector. Particularly in the case of wheat, macroeconomic "subsidy type" policies generate values of the exchange rate which dominate the effects of higher wheat prices. Wheat, of course, is far more sensitve to exchange rate movements than feed grains. In the case of wheat, export utilization dominates domestic utilization whereas the opposite situation exists for feed grains. The difference between exports for both wheat and feed grains across the two scenarios increases at an increasing rate over the horizon. This is in large part due to the same behavior in the exchange rate over the subsidy period compared to the tax period (table 2) . On the domestic front, food demand for wheat is basically the same under both the tax and subsidy scenarios. It is slightly lower under the subsidy scenario because of the higher level of prices. However, the higher income levels that are generated under the subsidy scenario almost compensate for the higher wheat prices. For domestic feed grain demand, steadily larger disappearance occurs under the subsidy scenario over the three-year horizon. This outcome is explained by the smaller difference between feed grain prices under the tax and subsidy scenarios and the in~roved profitability of the livestock sector.
Accordin~to the estimated equations for prices of wheat and feed grainsm ovements in inventories are a major determinant of real prices. Higher inventories of any type tend to reduce real prices of both ,.,rheat and feed grains. The degree to which the various types of inventory influence real prices should reflect the differential~in the speeds at which different stock types can be supplied to the market. Privately owned inventories and CCC nongovernment-owned inventories (nondefaulted loans) are readily available and can be sold at any time. These two categories of inventories will be referred to as market-oriented inventories. Government-owned stocks and the farmerowned reserve can only be released when prices exceed certain limits, namely, the release price for the farmer-owned reserve and at least 110 percent of the support price for government-ohned stocks. The latter rule, while discretionary, was applied in the active stock policy simulations as long as govermnent-owned stocks were above a negligible amount. Releases from the The share of market-oriented stocks rIses dramatically for wheat under the subsidy scenario. In fact, in the case of wheat, the government-owned level of stocks is approximately zero throughout the last two years of the horizon.
Under the tax scenario, as expected, the percentage of stocks held by the public sector increases dramatically over the horizon for both grains, especially feed grains. The latter result reflects, in part, the active public stock policy for corn and the level of subsidization emanating from the agricultural sector policies that hold resources in the production of feed grains as well as wheat.
A major beneficiary of the subsidy macroeconomic policies is the livestock sector. The results show much higher real prices tor all thre:; livestock products over the subsidy period. For beef, real prices under the subsidy scenario steadily increase over the horizon as they do for pork and poultry.
In the early part of the horizon, real prices of poultry are higher under~;,.e tax period. This is in large part due to the rapid adjustment of the poultry sector owing to the shorter biological lags than beef and pork.
Because of the favorable profi tabi1ity levels under the subs'j ' ,<" scenario, animals are retained for breeding purposes in all three livestock sectors, -20-especially the hog and poultry systems over the specified horizon. A significant amount of liquidation occurs in all three sectors under the tax scenario due largely to the high levels of real interest rates.
The demand for beef under the subsidy scenario increases due to the higher levels of income generated vis-a-vis the tax scenario. The lower interest rates also enhance profit~:hility to the sector. Also, the high production levels and reasonably stable prices of feed grains under both the tax and subsidy scenarios over the specified horizon (which, in turn, are due in part to and the opportunity cost of holding goverI~ental stocks. As can be seen from table 5, these costs are significantly higher during the tax scenario in . , .
-23-nominal terms. They arc also generally higher during the tax period in real terms, but th~differences are less dramatic. Even so, the real cost of governmental intervention is as much as 45 times larger tmder the tax scenario for some quarters than under the subsidy scenario (see table 5 ).
For all years of the ho':zon under the tax scenario, governmental costs of the wheat program rise steadily and exceed the current 1983 costs by almost 100 percent in 1986. In contrast, governmental costs under the subsidy scenario steadily declined over the horizon amounting to only 10 percent in 1986 of the governmental costs that were actually experienced in 1983. 6 In the case of wheat,~the major component of governmental costs is the deficiency payments that are incurred especially under the tax scenario. Neglecting the time value of lTIOney, governmental costs for the wheat program over the three-year horizon sum to $9.8 billion under the tax scenario and $2.99 billion under the subsidy scenario. In the case of corn, these same numbers are $27 billion versuS $7.4 billion. The total of the two costs,
i.e., governmental costs for feed grains and wheat under the tax scenario, run in the neighborhood of $37 billion; and, under the subsidy scenario, the same total cost is slightly more than $10 billion. These differences reflect the large transfer payments made under the deficiency scheme and the government's role in supporting market prices at or above the loan rate. The magnitudes of these numbers also reflect the impact of overshooting on the public sector when corrunodi ty prices are inflexible dmvInvard due to an active stock policy.
Net farm incomes for feed grains and wheat are reported in table 6 along with an approximate income measure for livestock. In computing these measures, no storage activity was considered; instead, total production is sold in the quarter in which it is produced at the market price or the support price depending on which is applicable. Government tr~lsfer payments are included in gross income for both feed grains and wheat. The cost measure is simply the variable cost times the number of planted acres plus storage costs of the farmer-owned reserve. Under the tax scenario, all computations presume a 100 percent participation rate while, under the subsidy scenario, a 60 percent participation rate is imposed. For the income measures from livestock operations, the retail price of meats rather than the farm level price is employed. As a result, gross inco:;,,:~is overstated by the difference between retail and farm level prices for each of the respective meats. Since the ..
• (-15.01) margins between the retail and farm level are fairly stable, the directional changes over time and between the tax and subsidy scenarios will be directly associated with the actual measures. In the results reported in table 5, the only cost measure that is included for each livestock operation is the feed cost.
As can be seen from table 6, income is generated during the harvest quarter; and, in the remaining quarters, carrying cost charges on the farmer-owned reserve are incurred for both wheat and feed grains. For the first two years of the horizon, wheat growers prefer a tax scenario combined with the sector policies. In the last year of the horizon, they prefer the subsidy scenario in nominal terms but, once again, the tax scenario in real terms. In the case of corn growers, a clear preference for the tax scenario, along with the sector policies, is preferred to the subsidy scenario. These results reflect in large part the huge transfer payments that are made by the government for both programs and the assumption of 100 percent participation under the tax scenario relative to a 60 percent participation rate under the subsidy scenar~'.
The major beneficiaries of the subsidy scenario are the livestock producers. They benefit in real terms from the expansionary monetary policies.
In the case of the tax scenario, they bear much of the brunt of feed grain prices being kept at the support level, and these producers suffer immensely froi'! the high real rates of interest that are generated under the t?X scenario. The real differences between the subsidy and tax scenarios for all three groups of livestock producers steadily increase from the first quarter of 1984 to the last quarter of 1986 where the real percentage difference in incc',e is almost 30 percent.
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Conclusions
Analysis of agricultural market dyna~ics must take into account not only real demand and supply forces directly related to the sector but also the effects of monetary and fiscal policies operating through these forces. To the extent that these polices are able to effect real changes in the short run, the agricultural sector will experience some instability in addition to that c8lJsed by the traditionally emphasized sources within the sector. The long-run effects of these external shocks can be argued to be neutral; but, to date, no conclusive evidence has been presented using a structural model of the agricultural sector. the practical length of the short run, which one might define as the time period during which the external shocks examined above are of concern to agrici'ltural policymakers, re:r:llns an open question.
A fair characterization of the monetary and fiscal policies of the early 1970s and the early 19805 is that the first period represented a subsidy period for agriculture, while the latter regime taxed the sector. Certainly, a number of events, such as weather shocks, also differed between the two time periods. Our simulation results hold these constant and indicate that substantial effects on prices and incomes in the agricultural sector emanate from macroeconomic policies.
Due to the nature of current agricultural polices, which support prices in the face of downward pressure but do little or nothing to prevent increases, there is an asymmetry in the effects of monetary policy. Much, if not all, of the benefits during a subsidy scenario accrue to the private sector. However, the dOhnside risk tcnds to be borne much more by the public sector, to the . point that, in our simulation results, a comparison (',' incomes shows that thc grain sector has a slight preference for a tax period since the entire burden . , ... ·.
-29-is shifted to government expenditures to support prices. This is not the case, of course, if a passive stock policy is followed and program participation is less than 100 percent. However, these results are conditional upon the starting inventory levels which were very high. Had the initial positions been more like those of 1973-74, for instance, producers would likely have preferred the subsidy period even with an active stock policy.
In the long run, if money is neutral, agricultural sector policies are likely to have a more significant influence on resource allocation to the U. S. agricultural sector than do macroeconomic policies and external event~. Thẽ sector policies that provide incentives for overa11ocation of resources to agricultural production, however, leave the. sector especially vulnerable to macroeconomic policies that impose adjustment costs on it. Such policies must, almost by definition, lead to a financial crisis and the current prob-. 1ems of farms, rural banks, and the government agencies which support the system. The implications of this study for the 1985 Food and Agriculture Act, therefore, must focus on this phenomenon of protracted periods of adjustment to changes in macroeconomic policies--overshooting periods, if you will. If macroeconomic policies were appropriately designed, there would be no need for sector-specific policies to address this problem. Experience in controlling business cycles, however~suggests that this is not likely to occur soon. If .the normative justification for governmental intervention in agricultural markets is to reduce instability, then instability from outside the sector due to moneta: y and fiscal policy suggests that agricultural policies may be appropriate to insulate the sector.
However, if agricultural programs are to play this role, there is a need to make them more flexible. Selecting policies which presumed a continuation of an inflationary environment was clearly inappropriate, just as would be the case if the new bill asstmled that inflation was once and for all conquered.
Instead, the augmentation of the degree of inherent instability of the agricultural sector by shocks generated fronl outside should be recognized and taken into account in setting storage, price support, and target price policies. This is in addition to the flexible policies advocated by Just and The above recommendations are prescriptive and contain several normative judgments, including the desirability of reducing instability in the agricultural sector.~e have not addressed the other objectives of agricultural policy which have been reported and debated many times (Rausser and Foster) .
The advocate of these objectives is free to place greater weight on farm program benefits tind less on the adverse effects on government outlays that tax scenarios such as ours can bring; however, even the most ardent critic of agricultural programs will agree that the failure to adapt to new macroeconomic developments is an additional shortcoming of the agricultural policy process. The degree to which agricultural polices should and can be adjusted, as well as the least-cost manner for doing so, remains an important and unanswered research and policy issue. 3A full description is contained in an extended version of this paper which is available on request (Rausser et al.) .
4For the active stock policy simulations, the estimated equations for gov-, ernment stocks of feed grains and wheat were used unless market prices were more than 10 percent above or below support prices. When price in a particular period fell below 90 percent of support, the simulation was repeated with 15 percent of market stocks flowing into government-held stocks. This process was repeated until price rose to 90 percent of the support level or market stocks became exhausted. The latter possibility could occur only with all remaining stocks being held in the farmer-owned reserve. When prices rose above 110 percent of support, government-owned stocks were liquidated moving to market stocks or directly into consL~ption. This process was continued until either governrnent-o\ffied stocks were exhausted or the price fell below 110 percent of support. As a result, many simulations generated prices well above 110 percent of support and zero levels of government-owned stocks. ..-/-
